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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
R. M. BIRDZELL, 
Plaintiff (Appellant), 
vs. 
UTAH OIL REFINING COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
Defendant (Respondent). 
Case No. 
7749 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant's statement of the case, insofar as complete, 
is substantially correct. However, Appellant does not set 
forth all of the facts, as disclosed by the record, which we 
believe are necessary for the determination of this case. 
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On December 15, 1936, Respondent Utah Oil Refining 
Company held under lease from the Western Pacific Rail-
road Company a parcel of real property located at Wend-
over, Tooele County, Utah, upon which it had constructed 
a service station building, complete with underground tanks, 
pumps and related facilities. On the said date Respondent 
subleased the service station premises and facilities to Ap-
pellant R. M. Birdzell for a period of one year. Thereafter, 
as the need arose, new subleases of the service station 
premises and facilities were entered into between Appel-
lant and Respondent, the last of such subleases being for 
a term of one year and dated December 31, 1941 (Record 
page 29-a). This sublease provided that, should lessee for 
any reason hold over after the expiration of the term of 
the lease, the tenancy of the lessee thereafter would be for 
subsequent periods of 30 days each. This last sublease was 
terminated and cancelled by mutual agreement between 
Appellant and Respondent on January 10, 1949 (Record 
page 30). 
The lease covering the service station premises be-
tween Respondent Utah Oil Refining· Company and the 
Western Pacific Railroad Company had expired on Decem-
ber 31, 1947, and it was not until January 18, 1950, that a 
new ten-year lease was negotiated between the parties, said 
new lease relating back to January 1, 1949. 
Sometime prior to December 29, 1947, Appellant and 
Respondent entered into negotiations for a new sublease 
of the service station premises and facilities, providing 
Respondent was successful in securing a new lease cover-
ing the property from the Western Pacific Railroad Com-
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pany. At this time Appellant was occupying the service sta-
tion premises and facilities under a month-to-month ten-
ancy, as provided in the sublease dated December 31, 1941, 
between Appellant and Respondent, as aforesaid (Record 
page 29-a). 
On December 29, 1947, Respondent, by letter directed 
to Appellant, stated the terms and conditions under which 
it was willing to sublease the premises to Appellant for a 
term of ten years, providing it was successful in securing 
a new lease from the Western Pacific Railroad Company 
(Record page 24). For the convenience of the Court, this 
letter is set forth verbatim: 
"Mr. R. M. Birdzell 
"Wend over, Utah. 
"Dear Mr. Birdzell : 
"December 29, 1947 
"We hold the premises occupied by our Station 
No. 511 at Wendover, Utah, und~r a lease from the 
Western Pacific Railroad Company, which expires 
December 31, 1947. 
"At the present time we are negotiating with 
that company for a lease of these premises for a 
further term of ten years commencing J anuar~ 1, 
1948, but have not as yet concluded such a lease. 
In the event that we make a new lease with that com-
pany for a term of ten years, we shall be willing to 
sublease the premises to you for the unexpired term 
of such lease pursuant to a written lease· to be en-
tered into between us which will include all appli-
cable and appropriate terms of the standard form of 
lease we now use in leasing service station pro-
perty to others, and in addition the following terms : 
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"1. That the lease shall be subject to all 
terms and conditions of the lease with Western 
Pacific Railroad Company and that you shall 
comply strictly with each and every of such 
terms and conditions. 
"2. That you shall occupy and use the 
leased property and operate the service station 
thereon in all respects in strict conformity with 
rules, regulations and instructions from time 
to time issued by the company and to the entire 
satisfaction of the company. And that you will 
make a special effort to keep the rest rooms in a 
clean and sanitary condition. 
"3. That you shall not sublease the prem-
ises in whole or in part or allow the same to be 
occupied or used by another without the prior 
written consent of the Company. 
"4. That, in the event the lease between 
the company and the railroad company shall be 
terminated pursuant to the terms and conditions 
thereof prior to the expiration of the term there-
of, the lease between the company and you shall 
thereupon be immediately terminated, effective 
upon the date of such prior termination. 
"5. That, in the event that you breach any 
term or condition of the lease or fail to comply 
therewith in any particular, the company shall 
be privileged to terminate the same with or with-
out notice to you and immediately take pos-
session of the leased premises. 
"6. That you will pay your present account 
with us in full and thereafter pay cash on de-
livery for all merchandise purchased from us. 
"It is impossible at this time to determine the 
amount of the monthly rental you shall be required 
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to pay under the terms of the lease. This will be 
determined by the Company after it has entered into 
the lease of the premises with the railroad company 
and will be based upon the amount of rent the com-
pany is required to pay to the railroad company. 
"Yours very truly, 
"UTAH OIL REFINING COMPANY 
"/s/ A. G. Olofson." 
The only response to this letter, as disclosed by the 
record, is a letter from Appellant to Respondent dated 
March 10, 1948, (Record page 28), which for the convenience 
of the Court is set forth verbatim: 
"R. M. 'SPIKE' BIRDZELL 
"Petroleum Products . . . Concrete Aggregate 
"Wend over, Utah 
"March 10, 1948 
"Mr. B. G. Midgley 
"Utah Oil Refining Company 
"Salt Lake City, Utah 
"Subject: FIRM LEASE-Station 511, Wend-
over, Utah. 
"Dear Mr. Midgley: 
"In lieu of my not being able to come in to the 
meeting with you regarding my pending lease I am 
writing. 
"It is my understanding that the lease can be 
drawn as soon as acceptable terms are agreed upon. 
"I would like to have the following privileges 
and provisions : 
"1. That I be privileged and allowed to 
sublet: 
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" (a) My garage building and business 
"(b) The cafe 
" (c) The lodge and cabins, 
for my lease period. (This that I might be able to 
concentrate on the petroleum part of the business, 
and at the same time see that a high standard of 
operation is observed.) 
"2. That I will accept and observe the 
lease provisions and rental increase made by 
the Western Pacific Railroad Company. 
"3. That in the event of termination of my 
lease I shall be allowed to remove any and all 
personal property, and that I shall in no way 
damage, impair, or remove any company pro-
• perty. 
"4. That every effort will be made to 
maintain a high standard of service operation 
with special concentration on our rest rooms. 
"5. It is further understood that the com-
pany will build new rest rooms and improve-
ments. 
"With kindest personal regards, I am Sincerely 
yours, 
"/s/ R. M. BIRDZELL." 
On December 29, 1947, Appellant was indebted toRe-
spondent in the amount of $4,202.69 for petroleum products 
purchased by Appellant from Respondent (Record page 
26). By the lOth day of January, 1949, this indebtedness 
had increased to $7,155.77, no part of which has been paid 
or tendered to Respondent (Record pages 26 and 27). 
Prior to March 14, 1951, Respondent brought an action 
against Appellant in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, seeking to collect the money due 
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and owing to it for petroleum products sold to and pur-
chased by Appellant, as aforesaid. On March 14, 1951, 
judgment was rendered by the Third Judicial District Court 
in favor of the Respondent and against Appellant in the 
amount of $7,124.12. No portion of this judgment has been 
paid or tendered to Respondent (Record pages 26 and 27) . 
On February 5, 1951, Appellant commenced the present 
action against the Respondent in the District Court of the 
Third Judicial District, Tooele County, State of Utah. On 
February 21, 1951, Respondent filed a Motion to Make the 
Complaint More Definite and Certain, and a Motion to 
Change the Place of Trial from Tooele County to Salt Lake 
County (Record ·pages 8 and 9). The Motion to Change 
the Place of Trial to Salt Lake County was granted on 
April 21, 1951. The Motion to Make the Complaint More 
Definite and Certain was denied on April 9, 1951 (Record 
page 4). 
The Trial Judge, prior to denying the Respondent's 
Motion to Make the Complaint More Definite and Certain, 
required the Appellant to state and delineate his cause of 
action, which, as delineated, constituted an action for a 
breach of an oral contract to execute a ten-year sublease of 
real property (Record pages 39 and 40). 
On June 20, 1951, Respondent, proceeding under Rule 
56 of UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, filed a 
Motion for Summary Judgment and supported its Motion 
with appendices and an affidavit, none of which have been 
controverted. Respondent moved for Summary Judgment 
for the reasons : 
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1. That the right , of action set forth in the 
complaint of Appellant, as limited by the Order of 
the Trial Court, was based upon the alleged breach 
of an oral agreement to execute a ten-year sublease 
of real property; and that said oral agreement was 
void under the Statute of Frauds, to-wit, Section 
33-5-3, Utah Code Annotated 1943; and . 
2. That the complaint failed to state a claim 
against Respondent upon which relief could be grant-
ed. 
(Record pages 19 to 30, inclusive.) 
The trial court on the 9th day of August, 1951, entered 
its final Judgment in the matter (Record page 31), in which 
it found that Appellant's cause of action was based upon 
the alleged breach by Respondent of an oral agreement be-
tween Appellant and Respondent, providing for a ten-year 
sublease of real property; that, inasmuch as neither the said 
agreement nor some adequate note or memorandum there-
of was in writing, subscribed by the Respondent, the oral 
agreement was void under the Statute of Frauds, to-wit, 
Section 33-5-3, Utah Code Annotated 1943; and, therefore, 
the Respondent was entitled to Summary Judgment against 
the Appellant of no cause of action. The Trial Court there-
upon entered its Judgment accordingly (Record pages 35 
and 36). 
It is from this Judgment that Appellant is appealing. 
POINT INVOLVED 
IS THE LETTER OF DECEMBER 29, 1947, A 
SUFFICIENT NOTE OR MEMORANDUM TO 
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SATISFY THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS, TO-
WIT, SECTION 33-5-3, UTAH CODE ANNO-
TATED 1943? 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE LETTER OF DECEMBER 29, 1947, IS NOT 
A SUFFICIENT NOTE OR MEMORANDUM TO 
SATISFY THE PROVISIONS OF THE STA-
TUTE OF FRAUDS, TO-WIT, SECTION 33-5-3, 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1943. 
A. 
The letter of December 29, 1947, did not contain all 
of the essential and material terms and conditions 
of a valid lease. 
Section 33-5-3, Utah Code Annotated 1943, provides: 
"Every contract for the leasing for a longer per-
iod than one year, or for the sale, of any lands, or 
any interest in lands, shall be void unless the con-
tract, or some note or memorandum thereof, is in 
writing subscribed by the party by whom the lease 
or sale is to be made, or by his lawful agent there-
unto authorized in writing." 
It has been universally held that a note or memorandum, 
sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the Statute of 
Frauds, must be one that contains all of the terms of the 
bargain necessary for a complete contract without the aid 
of parol evidence. 
With particular reference to leases, this rule is well 
stated by the commentators of A. L. R. in 16 A. L. R. 2d. 
624, as follows : 
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"Assuming that a single writing, or several writ-
ings taken together, otherwise meet the requirements 
of the statute of frauds as to signature, identification 
of the parties, and description of the premises to be 
leased, the requirements which the memorandum re-
lied on must meet to satisfy the statute as to terms 
and conditions of the lease are, as stated by the New 
York Court of Appeals (President Street Corp. v. 
Bolt;on Realty Corp. (1949), 300 N. Y. 63; 89 N. E. 
2d. 16; 16 A. L. R. 2d. 617; infra, Section 4), 'clear 
in theory and not peculiar to a contract for the lease 
of real property. The parties must have reached 
final agreement on all essential terms of a valid con-
tract, without reservation of any such term for 
future negotiation, and those terms must be em-
bodied in a writing.' In other words, the memoran-
dum relied on to establish a lease agreement must 
embody all the essential and material parts of the 
lease contemplated to be thereafter executed with 
such clarity and certainty as to show that the minds 
of the parties had met on all material terms so as 
to effect a complete and valid lease with no mater-
ial matter left for future agreement or negotiation. 
* * *" 
"The rule is well established, without dissent, 
that a memorandum of agreement for a lease, in 
order to satisfy the statute of frauds, must contain 
all of the essential and material terms and conditions 
of a valid lease. 
"This general rule is supported directly or in-
directly by all the cases in this annotation." 
In Stanley v. A. Levy and J. Zentner Company, 60 Nev. 
432, 112 Pac. 2d. 1047, the Court stated at page 1053 of 112 
Pac. 2d.: 
"The letter was written by defendant's author-
ized agent and there is not controversy qver its being 
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addressed to a third party. The question is as to its 
sufficiency as a note or memorandum to prevent the 
interposition of the statute. It is the consensus of 
judicial opinion that such writing must contain all 
the essential elements of the contract. The sub-
stantial parts of the contract must be embodied in the 
writing with such a degree of certainty as to make 
clear and definite the intention of the parties with-
out resort to oral evidence. Manufacturer's Light 
& Heat Co. 1. Lamp et al., 269 Pac. 517, 112 A. 679; 
Seymour v. Oelrichs, 156 Cal. 782, 106 P. 88, 134 
Am. St. Rep. 154; Mentz v. Newwitter, 122 N. Y. 
491, 25 N. E. 1044, 11 L. R. A. 97, 19 Am. St. Rep. 
514; Snow v. Nelson, C. C., 113 F. 353; 25 C. J. 
Sec. 318; 25 R. C. L. 645, Sec. 276; 2 Williston on 
Contracts, Rev. Ed. 1619, 1622." 
To the same effect see Harriet Michelson v. James E. 
Sherman, 310 Mass. 774, 39 N. E. 2d. 633; 25 Ruling Case 
Law, paragraphs 276 and 277; Annotation 153 A. L. R. 
1112, 1113; American Law Institute, Restatement, Con-
tracts, Vol. 1, Section 207. 
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah recognized this 
principle in the case of Collett v. Goodrich, 231 Pac. 2d. 730, 
in which the Court stated on May 16, 1951, at page 732: 
"The ·written memorandum which is relied on to 
satisfy the statute of frauds must contain all the 
essential terms and provisions of the contract. 
Hawaiian Equipment Co. v. Eimco Corp., Utah, 
1949, 207 Pac. 2d. 794; Block v. Sherman, 109 
Ind. App. 330, 34 N. E. 2d 951. The memorandum 
must show what the contract was, and not merely 
note the fact that some contract was made, Patter-
son v. Beard, 227 Iowa 401, 288 N. W. 414, 125 A. 
L. R. 393." 
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See also Campbell v. Nelson, 125 Pac. 2d., 413; Hawaiian 
Equipment Co. v. Eimco Corp., 207 Pac. 2d. 794. 
With this principle in mind, we respectfully invite the 
attention of the Court to the letter dated December 29, 
1947, upon which Appellant exclusively relies to overcome 
the requirements of the Statute of Frauds. 
It is the position of Respondent that this letter in two 
principal particulars fails to embody all of the essential 
and material terms of the sublease contemplated between 
the Respondent and Appellant, namely, 
( 1) The terms and conditions of the contem-
plated lease between Respondent and the Western 
Pacific Railroad Company were not contained in the 
letter of December 29, 1947; and 
( 2) The amount of rental, and the time and 
manner of payment, were not provided in the letter 
dated December 29, 1947. 
(1) 
Paragraph numbered 1 in this letter states: 
"1. That the lease shall be subject to all 
terms and conditions of the lease with Western 
Pacific Railroad Company, and that you shall 
comply strictly with each and every of such 
terms and conditions." 
The terms and conditions of the proposed lease with 
the railroad company had not been agreed upon at this 
time, and consequently could not be specified and agreed 
upon by Appellant and Respondent. The terms and condi-
tions of the lease with the railroad company could well have 
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been so arduous that they would have made the operation of 
the service station by Appellant impracticable, or even im-
possible, and if such was the case, it is our position that Ap-
pellant would not have been legally obligated to enter into 
a lease agreement with Respondent. 
Respondent submits that this paragraph of the letter, 
in and of itself, casts such uncertainty as to the terms and 
provisions of the proposed sublease as to cause the letter 
to be insufficient to satisfy the requirements of the Sta-
tute of Frauds. 
(2) 
The last paragraph of said letter to which we par-
ticularly invite the Court's attention provides: 
"It is impossible at this time to determine the 
amount of the monthly rental you shall be required 
to pay under the terms of the lease. This will be de-
termined by the company after it has entered into 
the lease of the premises with tpe railroad company 
and will be based upon the amount of rent the com-
pany is required to pay to the railroad company." 
In other words, the rental to be paid by Appellant had 
not been agreed upon, nor was a rental in any amount 
specified in the offer. Further, neither the time nor man-
ner of payment of rental was provided. The entire question 
of the amount of rental and manner of its payment was 
necessarily left open for further negotiations between the 
parties, inasmuch as prior to the conclusion of the negoti-
ations then in progress between Respondent and the West-
ern Pacific Railroad Company, the amount of rental Re-
spondent would be required to pay the railroad company 
would not be established, and the amount of rental Appel-
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lant would be required to pay the Respondent, under its 
sublease, could likewise not be determined. 
In the case of Rohan v. Proctor, 61 Cal. App. 447, 214 
Pac. 986, the Court stated at page 988 of 214 Pac.: 
"It may be stated as settled law that a memoran-
dum of agreement for a lease which is required to be 
in writing, in order to satisfy the statute of frauds, 
must contain all of the essential and material parts 
of the lease which is to be executed thereafter ac-
cording to its terms, and particularly must contain 
three essentials in order to establish its validity un-
der the statute of frauds. These are: First, a definite 
agreement as to the extent and boundary of the pro-
perty to be leased; second, a definite and agreed term; 
and third, a definite and agreed rental, and the time 
and manner of its payment * * *" (Italics sup-
plied.) 
See also Enlow v. Irwin, 80 Cal. App. 98, 251 Pac. 658. 
Levin v. Saroff, 54 Cal. App. 285, 201 Pa<!. 96J 
In the case of Carlson v. Bain, 116 Colo. 526, 182 Pac. 2d. 
909, the Supreme Court of Colorado stated at page 911, of 
182 Pac. 2d. : 
"* * * We have saidthat 'Under the author-
ities, to create a valid contract of lease but few points 
of mutual agreement are necessary: First, there must 
be a definite agreement as to the extent and bounds 
of the property leased ; second, a definite and agreed 
term; and, third, a definite and agreed price of 
rental, and the time and manner of payment. These 
appear to be the only essentials; * * *" (Italics 
supplied.) 
The Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of 
Grafton v. Cummings, 99 U.S. 100; 25 Law Ed. 366, stated 
at page 368 of 25 Law Ed. : 
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"In an agreement of sale there can be no con-
tract without both a vendor and a vendee. There can 
be no purchase without a seller. There must be a 
sufficient description of the thing sold, and of the 
price to be paid for it. It is, therefore, an essential 
element of a contract in writing that it shall contain 
within itself a description of the thing sold, by which 
it can be known or identified, of the price to be paid 
for it ,of the party who sells it, and the party who 
buys it. * * *" 
In the recent case of Sohio Petroleum Company v. Bran-
nan, 235 Pac. 2d 279, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma on 
May 22, 1951, stated in paragraph 2 of the Syllabus of the 
Court, the following : 
"To relieve an oral contract of the inhibitions 
of the statute of frauds, the written note or memoran-
dum thereof must be complete within itself, or by 
reference to other instruments in writing, as to all 
essential provisions of the oral agreement. Omission 
of exact terms of consideration is a fatal defect." 
(Italics supplied.)· 
To the same effect, see Wardell v. Williams, 62 Mich. 
50, 28 N. W. 796; O'Donnel et al. v. Lutter et al., 68 C. A. 
2d. 376, 156 Pac. 2d. 958; Stanley v. A. Levy and J. Zentner 
Company, supra; Annotation, 30 A. L. R. 1166; Page on 
Contracts, Vol. 1, paragraphs 87, 88 and 89; 49 Am. Jur. 
354; Elliott on Contracts, Vol. 5, paragraph 4550. 
It is· submitted that inasmuch as the letter dated De-
cember 29, 1947, (1) did not contain the terms and condi-
tions of the contemplated lease between Respondent and 
the Western Pacific Railroad Company, and (2) did not 
provide for the amount of rental, and the time and manner 
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of payment thereof, it is not a sufficient note or memoran-
dum to satisfy the Statute of Frauds. 
B. 
The letter of December 29, 1947, was not intended 
by the Respondent, nor considered by the Appel-
lant, as a memorandum evidencing a complete 
agreement of a ten-year sublease of the service sta-
tion premises. 
It is the position of the Respondent that the letter dated 
December 29, 1947, was nothing more than an invitation 
to Appellant to enter into negotiations with Respondent for 
a sublease of the service station premises. We submit that 
the letter of December 29, 1947, clearly substantiates this 
position. In effect, the letter states that in the event Re-
spondent is able to secure a ten-year lease of the service 
station premises from the Western Pacific Railroad Com-
pany, it would be willing to sublease the premises to Appel-
lant for the unexpired term of the lease with the railroad 
company, pursuant to a written lease to be entered into be-
tween Respondent and Appellant, and that, among other 
provisions, the written lease would include all of the ap-
plicable and appropriate terms of the standard form of 
lease used by the Respondent and, in addition, be subject 
to all the terms and conditions of the Lease between Re-
spondent and the Western Pacific Railroad Company. It 
should be noted at this point that the terms and conditions 
of the lease with the railroad company were not known, as 
this lease was, on December 29, 1947, in the process of 
negotiation. Also, what terms of the standard form of Re-
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spondent's lease would be applicable and appropriate were 
not specified. In view of these circumstances, it was clearly 
not the intention of the Respondent to set forth in this 
letter the terms of a complete sublease agreement between 
itself and the Appellant. 
We further maintain that the record is equally clear 
that Appellant did not consider the letter dated December 
29, 1947, as a memorandum embodying all the terms and 
conditions of a complete and legally enforceable contract. 
In fact, the record discloses that Appellant was not in agree-
ment with the provisions set forth in the said letter of De-
cember 29, 1947, and some two months later, to-wit, on 
March 10, 1948, Appellant directed a letter to Respondent, 
in which he stated: 
"It is my understanding that the lease can be 
drawn as soon as acceptable terms are agreed upon." 
and then proceeded to outline certain of the provisions which 
he desired (Record page 28). 
It appears unescapable to Respondent that Appellant 
did not consider the letter of December 29, 1947, as repre-
senting a memorandum containing all of the essential pro-
visions of a completed sublease agreement between the 
parties, and that on March 10, 1948, negotiations with re-
·' spect to a written sublease covering the service station 
premises were then in progress. 
For the purpose of this Brief, we have treated the letter 
as the most it can possibly represent and that is, an offer 
.· by Respondent to Appellant, stating the terms and conditions 
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under which Respondent would be willing to give a ten-
year sublease covering the service station premises to 
Appellant. Treating the letter as an offer from Respondent, 
the record is likewise clear that it was never accepted by 
the Appellant. 
The ·letter from Appellant to Respondent dated March 
10, 1948, in addition to stating in effect that acceptable 
terms for a sublease had not been agreed upon, was not 
an unqualified acceptance of Respondent's offer of December 
29, 1947. To the contrary, Appellant's letter set forth con-
ditions in direct conflict with the offer. As examples of this 
fact, the Court's attention is invited to paragraph numbered 
3 of the offer which provided that Appellant could not sub-
lease the premises, in whole or in part, or allow the same 
to be occupied or used by another without the prior written 
consent of the Respondent. Appellant's letter of March 10, 
1948, states in paragraph numbered 1 that he wants the 
privilege of subletting the garage building and .business, the 
cafe, the lodge and cabins for his lease period~ 
Also, the Court's attention is invited to paragraph num-
bered 5 of Appellant's letter dated March 10, 1948, which 
states: 
"It is further understood that the company will 
build new rest rooms and improvements." 
This statement is entirely foreign to anything contained 
in Respondent's offer. 
We submit that Appellant's letter of March 10, 1948, 
can represent nothing more than a counter-offer and there-
by terminated Respondent's offer of December 29, 1947. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
19 
This offer was not renewed, nor was Appellant's counter-
offer accepted by Respondent. 
It is a settled principle of the Law of Contracts that, 
in order to form a contract, the offer and acceptance must 
express assent to one and the same thing. The acceptance 
of the offer must be substantially as made; there must be 
no variation between the acceptance and the offer. An offer 
imposes no obligations until accepted according to its terms, 
without qualification or departure. 
In the case of Candland v. Oldroyd et al., 67 Utah 605, 
248 Pac. 1101, the Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
stated at page 1102 of 248 Pacific: 
"It is a recognized principle or rule of contracts 
that an offer to do a certain thing or sell a particular 
article, conveyed to another by letter, with the offer 
accepted by the one to whom the offer is addressed, 
such offer and acceptance is a completed contract and 
one binding upon the parties. In order for there to be 
a completed contract by offer made by letter and ac-
ceptance, the acceptance must agree wholly with the 
offer made. As expressed by the· court in Potts v. 
Whitehead, 23 N.J. Eq. 514: 
"'An acceptance, to be good, must of course 
be such as to conclude an agreement or contract 
between the parties. And to do this it must in 
every respect meet and correspond with the 
offer, neither falling within nor going beyond 
the terms proposed, but exactly meeting them at 
all points and closing with them just as they 
stand.'" 
In the case of William E. Iselin v. United States, 271 
U. S. 136, 70 Law Ed. 872, Mr. Chief Justice Taft stated 
at page 874 of 70 Law Ed.: 
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"It is well settled that a proposal to accept, or an 
acceptance upon terms varying from those offered is 
a rejection of the offer, and puts an end to the negoti-
ation, unless the party who made the original offer 
renews it, or assents to the modification suggested. 
Beaumont v. Prieto, 249 U. S. 554, 63 L. Ed. 770, 39 
Sup. Ct. Rep. 383; Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. v. 
Columbus Rolling Mill, 119 U. S. 149, 151, 30 L. 
Ed. 376, 377, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 168; First Nat. Bank v. 
Hall, 101 U. S. 43, 50, 25 L. Ed. 822, 825; Carr v. 
Duval, 14 Pet. 77, 82, 10 L. Ed. 361, 364; Eliason v. 
Henshaw, 4 Wheat. 228, 4 L. Ed. 557." 
See, also, Eliason et al. v. Henshaw, 17 U. S. 225, 4 
Law Ed. 556; Steve Todorovich v. Kinnickinnic Mutual 
Building & Loan Association, 238 Wis. 39, 298 N. W. 226; 
American Law Institute Restatement, Contracts, Vol. 1, 
paragraph 60; Thompson on Real Property, Permanent 
Edition, Vol. 8, page 480, paragraph 4559. 
In another regard Respondent maintains that it is 
clear that Appellant did not accept Respondent's offer of 
December 29, 1947. The Court's attention is invited to 
paragraph numbered 6 of the letter dated December 29, 1947, 
which provides : 
"6. That you will pay your present account 
with us in full and thereafter pay cash on delivery 
for all merchandise purchased from us." 
As has been stated, it is uncontroverted that, as of the 
date of the letter, the Appellant was indebted to the Re-
spondent in the sum of $4,202.69 for petroleum products 
sold by the Respondent to the Appellant, and no part of this 
indebtedness has ever been paid or tendered (Record page 
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26). The condition contained in paragraph numbered 6 of 
the letter dated December 29, 1947, results in the offer being 
one for an unilateral contract that could only be accepted by 
the performance of an act by the Appellant, namely, the 
payment or tender of payment of said indebtedness. This 
was not done. In support of this well established principle of 
the Law of Contracts, we invite the Court's attention to the 
case of Hartzell v. Choctaw Lumber Co. of Delaware et al., 
22 Pac. 2d. 387, wherein the Court stated in the Syllabus 
by the Court : 
"In order that an offer and acceptance may 
result in a binding contract, the acceptance must be 
absolute, unconditional, and identical with the terms 
of the offer, and must in every respect meet and cor-
respond with the offer; and any qualification of or 
departure from those terms invalidates the offer." 
Also, to Williston on Contracts, Revised Edition, Vol. 
1, paragraphs 67 and 73, pages 191 and 209. In paragraph 
73, it is stated : 
"In order to make a bargain, it is necessary that 
the acceptor shall give in return for the offeror's 
promise exactly the consideration which the offeror 
requests. If an act is requested, that very act and no 
other can be given." 
See also, 12 Am. Jur., paragraphs 43 and 44, page 537. 
We submit that inasmuch as the Respondent's offer of 
December 29, 1947, was not accepted by the Appellant, it 
does not evidence a meeting of the minds of the parties and 
cannot constitute a memorandum of the terms and condi-
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. tions of a contract between the parties, sufficient to satisfy 
the Statute of Frauds. 
We respectfully submit that the Trial Court did not err 
when it rendered Summary Judgment for Respondent. 
Respectfully submitted, 
J. T. HAMMOND, JR., 
GRANT A. BROWN, 
Attorneys for Defendant (Respondent). 
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